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 ABSTRACT 
 
Since pass-through of exchange rate changes on import and export prices are asymmetric, we expect a 
country’s inpayments (export earnings) and outpayments (cost of imports) to react to exchange rate 
changes asymmetrically too. We demonstrate this hypothesis by considering trade between Malaysia 
and each of her 11 largest trading partners. We find that while the short-run effects of exchange rate 
changes on Malaysia’s inpayments and outpayments are asymmetric with all partners, the long-run 
asymmetric effects are present in less than half of the partners. The results are partner-specific.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Marshall-Lerner (ML) condition in international economics asserts that if sum of a 
country’s import and export demand price elasticities exceeds one, a devaluation or currency 
appreciation will improve that country’s trade balance with the rest of the world. In estimating this 
consdition, usually import and export quantities are regressed on measures of economic activities and 
relative prices. Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2013) provide the most recent review of the literature.  
 Estimating the Marshall-Lerner condition using aggregate trade flows of a country is said to 
suffer from aggregation bias. Suppose the ML condition is met. Clearly, what is true at the aggregate 
level, may not be true with each individual partner. While the condition could be satisfied with one 
partner, it may not be satisfied with another partner. Validating such claims requires estimating the ML 
condition using bilateral trade flows between two countries. However, import and export prices are not 
available at bilateral level as they are available between one country and the world. The literature here 
has followed a different path and regressed nominal value of imports and exports on the real bilateral 
exchange rate as a measure of relative prices. By doing so researchers directly assess the effects of 
exchange rate changes on a country’s inpayments from and outpayments to its trading partners. Haynes 
et al. (1986), Bergstrand (1987), Cushman (1987), Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2004), Bahmani-
Oskooee et al. (2005a, 2005b), Bahmani-Oskooee and Harvey (2006) are some examples.  
 Concentrating on the last study, Bahmani-Oskooee and Harvey (2006) investigated the 
response of Malaysia’s inpayments from and outpayments to several of its major trading partners. The 
real bilateral exchange rate had significant long-run effects on Malaysia’s inpayment from five partners 
and on its outpayments to only one partner. We wonder if lack of significant link between the real 
bilateral exchange rate and inpayments and outpayments with most partners could be due to assuming 
the effects of exchange rate changes to be symmetric which requires using linear models. Could the 
  
 
  
outcome be different if we introduce asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes and rely upon 
estimating nonlinear models of inpayments and outpayments schedule? After all, there is now clear 
evidence by Bussiere (2013) who shows that import and export prices adjust to exchange rate changes 
in an asymmetric manner. Since these prices are used to calculate inpayments (export earnings) and 
outpayments (cost of imports), we can expect a country’s inpayments and outpayments to react to 
exchange changes in an asymmetric manner too. Bahmani-Oskooee and Fariditavana (2016) have also 
argued that traders’ reactions and expectations could be different to a depreciation as compared to an 
appreciation. They have then demonstrated that the trade balance reacts to exchange rate changes 
asymmetrically. To demonstrate out conjecture in this paper, we introduce both the linear and nonlinear 
models in Section II. We then report our empirical results in Section III. A summary is provided in 
Section IV that is followed by data Appendix.    
 
II. The Models and the Methods 
 Since we are extending Bahmani-Oskooee and Harvey’s (2006) linear models to nonlinear 
specifications, we begin with their specifications of the inpayments and outpayments first as follows:  
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Equation (1) is commonly referred to as an inpayment schedule where VXj,t is the nominal value of  
Malaysian exports to trading partner i or her export earnings paid by i. Two variables determine these 
earnings. Level of economic activity in partner i (Yi), and real bilateral exchange rate between 
Malaysian ringgit and partner i’s currency (REXi).  Since an increase in partner i’s economic activity is 
  
 
  
expected to boost Malaysia’s exports, we expect an estimate of b in (1) to be positive. From the 
Appendix we gather that the REXi is defined in a manner that a decline reflects depreciation of ringgit 
against i’s currency. Therefore, if ringgit depreciation is to increase Malaysia’s inpayments by partner i, 
we expect an estimate of c to be negative. Clearly, this is based on the assumption that partner i’s 
import demand is price elastic. If it is inelastic, then inpayments could decline. 
 Similarly, specification (2) outlines determinants of Malaysia’s outpayments to partner i where 
VMj,t is the value of Malaysian imports from partner i and is assumed to depend on the Malaysia’s own 
income or economic activity (YMY) and the real bilateral exchange rate. Again, we expect income 
elasticity to be positive if an increase in Malaysian income leads to an increase in her imports and 
import costs. On the other hand, if a real depreciation of ringgit reduces Malaysia’s imports, her 
outpayments or imports costs will decline. Again, this is under the assumption that  Malaysian import 
demand is elastic. In this case we would expect an estimate of f to be positive. Otherwise, it could be 
negative.  
 Estimates of (1) and (2) only yield the long-run effects of independent variables on the 
dependent variables. In order to infer the short-run effects, we need to specify them as error-correction 
models. Again we follow Bahmani-Oskooee and Harvey (2006) and Pesaran et al.’s (2001) and rely 
upon the following specifications:   
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In both specifications, short-run effects are reflected in the estimates of coefficients attached to first-
  
 
  
differenced variables and long-run effects are inferred by the estimates of 
21
 and normalized on γ0 
in (3) and by the estimates of '
2
'
1
 and normalized on 
'
0
 in (4).  However, we must establish 
cointegration among the variables in each model if long-run effects are to be valid. Pesaran et al (2001) 
recommend applying the F test to establish joint significance of the lagged level variables. They tabulate 
new critical values for the F test which accounts for integrating properties of variables.1 
 The main assumption in estimating (3) and (4) is that response of inpayments in (3) and 
outpayments in (4) to changes in the exchange rate are symmetric, i.e., exchange rate elasticities are the 
same for a depreciation as compared to an appreciation. As discussed in the previous section, this need 
not be the case. Here we deviate from previous literature by engaging in an asymmetry analysis. We do 
this by following Shin et al. (2014) and modify both specifications (3) and (4). The modification 
involves simply separating currency depreciations from appreciations. For this purpose we first form 
ΔLnREX which reflects rate of change of the real exchange rate where positive values signify 
appreciations and negative values signify depreciations. Using the partial sum concept, we then 
construct two new series as follows:    
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In (5) the POSt variable which is the partial sum of positive changes represents only ringgit 
appreciation and the NEGt variable which is the partial sum of negative changes represents only 
ringgit depreciation. In the next step, we go back to (3) and (4) and replace LnREX variable by 
POSt and NEGt to arrive at two new models as follows:    
         
                         
1
 Pesaran et al. (2001) show that their upper bound critical values  are also good for models that have combination 
of I(0) and  I(1) variables.   
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and   
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Since constructing the partial sum variables introduce nonlinearity in specifications (6) and (7), they are 
referred to as nonlinear ARDL models, whereas, specifications (3) and (4) are referred to as linear 
ARDL models. Shin et al. (2014) show that Pesaran et al.’s (2001) approach of estimating the linear 
models could be applied to (6) and (7). They even argue that due to dependency between the two 
partial sum variables, they should be treated as a single term in (6) and (7) so that the same critical 
values of the F test could be used in all models.2  
 Once (6) and (7) are estimated by the OLS method, a few hypothesis with regards to 
asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on inpaymnets and outpayments could be tested. First, 
short-run “adjustment asymmetry” will be confirmed if n3 ≠ n4 in both (6) and (7). Second, short-run 
asymmetric effects will be observed if at each lag  
jj
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Finally, long-run asymmetry will be established if 
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all these inequalities, the Wald test is the recommended test.3  
                         
2
 See Shin et al. (2014, p. 291). 
3
 For more on the application of these methods see Delatte and Lopez-Villavicencio (2012), Verheyen (2013), 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Fariditavana (2015), Bahmani-Oskooee and Saha (2015), Gogas and Pragidis (2015), 
  
 
  
 
III. Empirical Results 
 Although our intention is to demonstrate the asymmetric response of Malaysia’s inpayments 
and outpayments to exchange rate changes which requires estimating (6) and (7) only, for comparison 
we also estimate the linear models (3) and (4). Quarterly data over the period 1991I-2015IV are used 
to estimate all models between Malaysia and each of her 11 major trading partners. In each case, a 
maximum of 12 lags are imposed on first-differenced variables and Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC) is used to select an optimum specification. The results are then reported in Table 1 for inpayment 
models and in Table 2 for outpayment models. Furthermore, since different critical values are used for 
different estimates and diagnostics, they are collected in several footnotes towards the end of each 
table. They are then used to identify an estimate by * if it is significant at the 10% level and by ** if it is 
significant at the 5% level. Additionally, since Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 may have some 
implication on Malaysian trade, especially with partners from Asia, a dummy is included to account for 
the Crisis. 
Tables 1 and 2 go about here 
 Let us first consider the Malaysian inpayments schedule and Table 1. From the estimates of the 
linear model (3) that is indicated by L-ARDL and Panel A we gather that the real exchange rate has 
short-run effects on Malaysian inpayments in all models except in the bilateral model with the 
Philippines. This is because in each case, the real exchange rate carries at least one lagged significant 
coefficient. However, when we consider the short-run estimates from the nonlinear models (NL-
ARDL) either the ΔPOS or ΔNEG variable carry at least one significant coefficient in all models. These 
                                                                  
Durmaz (2015), Baghestani and Kherfi (2015),  Pal and Mitra (2016), Al-Shayeb and Hatemi-J.(2016), Lima et 
al. (2016), Nusair (2017), Aftab et al. (2017), and Gregoriou (2017). 
 
  
 
  
results support the fact that exchange rate changes do have short-run effects on the inpayments of 
Malaysia from every trading partner.  
 The short-run estimates from the nonlinear models, however, yield additional information with 
regards to asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes. As can be seen, optimum lags on ΔPOS are 
different than those on ΔNEG in all models except the Malaysian-China and Malaysian-Singapore 
models. This supports presence of short-run “adjustment asymmetry” in most bilateral models. 
Furthermore, clearly the size of estimated coefficient attached to ΔPOS at lag j is different than the 
estimate attached to ΔNEG at the same lag, supporting short-run asymmetric effects. As for the short-
run cumulative or impact asymmetry, we apply the Wald test to equality of sum of the short-run 
estimates attached to ΔPOS and to ΔNEG. This Wald test that is reported as Wald-S in Panel C 
reveals that there is evidence of impact asymmetry in the cases of only Indonesia, Japan, and 
Singapore, all partners from Asia. Do these short-run effects last into the long run?  
 Long-Run normalized coefficient estimates are reported in Panel B. Here we will look for 
significant long-run estimates that are supported by significant F test for cointegration. In case the F is 
insignificant, we rely upon an alternative test that is known as the t-test. Under this alternative test we 
use the normalized long-run estimates and the long-run model (e.g., equation 1) and generate the error 
term denoted by ECM. We then replace the linear combination of lagged level variables in (3) by 
ECMt-1. After imposing the same optimum lags from Panel A, this new specification is estimated. If 
estimate of the coefficient attached to ECMt-1 is negative and significant, cointegration will be 
supported. The t-test that is used to verify significance of this estimate has a new distribution and like 
the F test, Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 303) tabulate new critical values.  
 From the long-run estimates and diagnostic statistics in Panel C we gather that only in four 
                                                                  
 
  
 
  
linear models the exchange rate carries a significant coefficient that is validated by a significant F or 
ECMt-1 test. These are the Malaysian bilateral models with Asutralia, China (Mainland), Singapore, and 
U.K. Furthermore, while in the results with Australia and U.K. ringgit depreciation will increase 
Malaysian inpayments, in the cases of China and Singapore, it will decrease them. It appears that 
import demand of China and Singapore for Malaysian goods are inelastic.4 However, when we 
consider the normalized long-run coefficient estimates from nonlinear models, there are five models in 
which either the POS or the NEG variable carries a significant coefficient that is supported by 
asymmetry cointegration. These are the bilateral inpyments models of Malaysia with Australia, 
Indonesia, Singapore, U.K. and the U.S.. In all of these models (except the case of U.K.), the long-run 
asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes are supported by the Wald test that is reported as Wald-L 
in Panel C.   
 Clearly, the results are partner-specific. For example, in the results with the U.S. in the linear 
model the real ringgit-dollar rate had no long-run effects on the Malaysian inpayments by the U.S. If 
we were to rely upon only the linear model, the process would have stopped right here and we would 
have concluded that the real exchange rate has no long-run effects. However, the nonlinear model 
reveals that appreciation of ringgit against the U.S. dollar will hurt Malaysian export earnings from the 
U.S. but ringgit depreciation will have no effect, a clear sign of long-run asymmetric effects. Or in the 
case of Singapore, while ringgit depreciation will hurt Malaysia’s inpayments, ringgit appreciations will 
have no long-run effects.  
 A few other diagnostics are also reported in Panel C. To test for serial correlation among the 
residuals we report the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) statistic. In most models it is insignificant, supporting 
autocorrelation free residuals. We also report Ramsey’s specification test as RESET. That is also 
                         
4
 These results are more or less consistent with Bahmani-Oskooee and Harvey (2006). 
  
 
  
insignificant in most models, implying that most models are correctly specified.  We have also applied 
the well-known CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests to the residuals of each optimum model to establish 
the stability of all estimated coefficients. These two tests are represented by CS and CS2 respectively. 
Identifying stable estimates by “S” and unstable ones by “US”, it is clear that most estimates are stable. 
Finally, the size of adjusted R2 is reported to judge the goodness of fit in each model. It is higher in the 
nonlinear models relative to linear models. 
 Next we turn to Table 2 and estimates of outpayments schedules outlined by equations (4) and 
(7). Short-run results are similar to those of Malaysia’s inpayments models in that they are significant in 
almost all linear and nonlinear models. However, the estimates of nonlinear models support short-run 
asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes in all models since at any given lag, the estimate attached 
to the ΔPOS variable is different than the one attached to the ΔNEG variable at the same lag. 
However, the sum of these estimates are significantly different from each other in the cases of 
Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, U.K., and the U.S., supporting short-run impact asymmetry in 
these six cases. There is also evidence of short-run “adjustment asymmetry” in all nonlinear models 
except the cases of Hong Kong and the Philippines. Do these short-run asymmetric effects last into the 
long run?  
 From the long-run estimates of the linear model in Panel B, we gather that the real exchange 
rate has meaningful significant effects on Malaysia’s outpayments to Australia, Hong Kong, and the 
U.S. However, in the  nonlinear models, either the POS or the NEG variable carry a significant 
coefficient that is supported by either the F or ECMt-1 test in the cases of China (mainland), Japan, 
Singapore, and the U.S. In all these cases, long-run asymmetric effects is supported by Wald-L 
statistic, though in the case of China, the support is marginal. Although the results are partner-specific, 
they mostly favor the nonlinear model. For example, in the bilateral model with China (mainland) there 
  
 
  
was lack of symmetric cointegration whereas, in the nonlinear model there is evidence of asymmetric 
cointegration. This must be due to introducing nonlinear adjustment of the exchange rate. Or in the 
model with Japan, the long-run effects of the exchange rate was insignificant. However, this is not the 
case in the nonlinear model. Introducing nonlinearity not only has brought about asymmetric 
cointegration but also has yielded significant long-run effects of both ringgit appreciation and 
depreciation. The same is true of the outpayments with Singapore.5    
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion   
 One area in international economics in which researchers have tried to assess the impact of 
currency depreciation on a country’s external accounts is to directly relate export earnings 
(inpayments0 and import payments (outpayments) to the real exchange rate in addition to some scale 
variables. All previous studies that engaged in this sort of research assumed that exchange rate changes 
do have symmetric effects on a country’s inpayments from and outpayments to a trading partner. 
However, this need not be the case. Indeed, there are evidences that point to asymmetric effects of 
exchange rate changes on inpayments and outpayments. Some recent studies have shown that import 
and export prices react to exchange rate changes in an asymmetric manner. Since import and export 
prices are used to calculate outpayments and inpayments respectively, we would expect outpayments 
and inpayments also to react asymmetrically to exchange rate changes. 
 To demonstrate out conjecture in this paper we concentrate on the Malaysian inpayments from 
and outpayments to her 11 largest partners. First, we assume the effects of exchange rate changes to be 
symmetric so that we can use Pesaran et al.’s (2001) linear ARDL approach to replicate a previous 
                         
5
 All other diagnostic statistics are similar to those in Table 1 and need no detailed explanations. There is lack of 
serial correlation in most models, most optimum models are correctly specified, and estimates are stable. 
  
 
  
study. Next we engage in asymmetry analysis and use Shin et al.’s (2014) nonlinear ARDL approach 
and asymmetry cointegration to show that this later approach yields useful results that were masked by 
the linear model. The findings that are partner-specific could be best summarized by saying that in some 
cases in which the exchange rate had no significant effects on Malaysian inpayments and outpayments 
in the linear model, it had significant asymmetric effects in the nonlinear models. Overall, the nonlinear 
models revealed that exchange rate changes have short-run asymmetric effects on Malaysian 
inpayments from and outpayments to most of her 11 partners. However, short-run asymmetric effects 
lasted into long-run asymmetric effects in less than half of the partners.  
 A major policy implication of our approach is that when currency depreciations are separated 
from appreciations, a country can determine if its inpayments and outpayments will respond to a 
depreciation and to an appreciation asymmetrically. Since import demand elasticities differ from one 
country to another, clearly inpayments and outpayments will react in an asymmetric manner to 
exchange rate changes. Such findings cannot be extracted from linear models in which the exchange 
rate enters into the model as a single entity and not as two separate entities. Therefore, we highly 
recommend applications of nonlinear models in which changes in the exchange rate are decomposed 
into appreciations and depreciations and their effects are inferred separately.     
Appendix 
Data Definition and Sources 
 
Quarterly data over the period 1991(I)-2015(IV) are used to carry out the empirical analysis.  They 
come from the following sources: 
a. Direction of Trade Statistics by the IMF.  
b. International Financial statistics (IFS) 
 
Due to unavailability of data on some variables, however, the period was restricted to 
Japan: 1994(I)-2015(IV), Singapore: 1991(I)-2015(II), Thailand: 1993(I)-2014(IV), China, 
mainland: 1996(I)-2014(IV).  
 
Variables: 
  
 
  
VXi =  Malaysia export value to trading partners. [Data are collected from source (a)] 
 
VMi =  Malaysia import value from trading partners. [Data are collected from source (a)] 
 
YMY = Measure of Malaysia’s income. It is proxied by index of real GDP. The data come from source b. 
   
 
Yi = Trading partner i’s income. This is also proxied by the index of real GDP in country i and the data 
come from source b.    
 
REXi = The real bilateral exchange rate of the Malaysian Ringgit against the currency of partner i. It is 
defined as REXi = (PMY. NEXi/ Pi) where NEXi is the nominal exchange rate defined as number of 
units of partner i’s currency per Ringgit, PMY is the price level in Malaysia. (measured by CPI) and Pi is 
the price level in country i (also measured by CPI). Thus, a decline in REX reflects a real depreciation 
of the ringgit. All nominal exchange rates and price levels data come from source. 
Source: IFS, 2016. 
 
 2015 2015  
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)    
 exports import Net exports 
Australia $   7,213,525,262.00 $     4,501,109,060.00 $   2,712,416,202.00 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong $   9,482,420,396.00 $     2,964,859,796.00 $   6,517,560,600.00 
China, P.R.: Mainland $ 25,986,959,459.00 $   33,155,162,002.00 $  (7,168,202,543.00) 
Indonesia $   7,472,519,471.00 $     7,949,546,576.00 $     (477,027,105.00) 
Japan $ 18,999,051,479.00 $   13,785,387,000.00 $   5,213,664,479.00 
Korea, Republic of $   6,474,676,284.00 $     7,968,249,507.00 $  (1,493,573,223.00) 
Philippines $   3,369,081,281.00 $     1,677,509,481.00 $   1,691,571,800.00 
Singapore $ 27,807,726,249.00 $   21,051,615,548.00 $   6,756,110,701.00 
Thailand $ 11,403,360,102.00 $   10,691,044,987.00 $      712,315,115.00 
United Kingdom $   2,386,763,662.00 $     1,834,669,890.00 $      552,093,772.00 
United States $ 18,879,767,165.00 $   14,193,521,516.00 $   4,686,245,649.00 
World $199,957,530,606.00 $ 175,976,965,135.00 $ 23,980,565,471.00 
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 Table 1: Full-Information Estimates of Both Linear ARDL (L-ARDL) and Nonlinear ARDL (NL-ARDL) Export Demand Model  
  i = Australia i = China, Mainland i=Hong Kong i = Indonesia 
L – ARDL# NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL L – ARDL# NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL 
Panel A: Short–Run Estimates 
ΔlnY i,t -1.54(0.57) -1.88(0.73) 2.59(2.93)** 2.05(1.79)* 1.37(4.18)** 1.26(3.81)** 0.18(1.07) 1.25(2.19)** 
ΔlnY i,t-1 0.63(0.22)  -0.74(0.72) -2.11(1.40) -0.78(4.13)** -0.74(3.01)**  0.60(1.15) 
ΔlnY i,t-2 3.23(1.23)  1.23(1.31) -1.99(1.15) 0.66(2.11)** 0.62(1.89)*  -0.75(1.72)* 
ΔlnY i,t-3   1.61(1.67)* 0.02(0.01)    -0.42(0.97) 
ΔlnY i,t-4   -0.55(0.55) -3.14(1.81)*    -1.42(2.84)** 
ΔlnY i,t-5   1.97(2.18)** -5.29(2.59)**    -0.98(1.76)* 
ΔlnY i,t-6    -4.81(2.89)**     
ΔlnY i,t-7    -6.10(3.73)**     
ΔlnY i,t-8    -3.86(3.01)**     
ΔlnY i,t-9         
ΔlnREXi,t -0.37(1.22)  1.68(2.29)**  0.60(2.48)**  -0.43(3.49)**  
ΔlnREXi,t-1 0.55(1.47)  -1.15(1.71)*      
ΔlnREXi,t-2 0.49(1.39)        
ΔlnREXi,t-3 -0.74(2.31)**        
ΔlnREXi,t-4 0.62(2.04)**        
ΔlnREXi,t-5         
ΔlnREXi,t-6         
ΔPOSt  -2.41(4.44)**  -8.25(1.69)*  0.97(1.61)  -0.99(1.76)* 
ΔPOSt-1    16.39(2.61)**    1.02(1.28) 
ΔPOSt-2    21.30(3.66)**    3.24(4.02)** 
ΔPOSt-3    5.49(0.87)    2.85(3.27)** 
ΔPOSt-4    16.12(2.69)**    3.07(3.58)** 
ΔPOSt-5    16.34(3.09)**     
ΔPOSt-6    1.81(0.39)     
ΔPOSt-7    16.72(3.45)**     
ΔPOSt-8    12.03(2.87)**     
ΔPOSt-9    -3.86(1.02)     
ΔPOSt-10    -2.70(0.69)     
ΔPOSt-11    -4.44(1.21)     
ΔPOSt-12         
ΔNEGt  -0.36(0.34)  7.57(2.55)**  1.63(2.01)**  0.79(0.66) 
ΔNEGt-1  2.17(1.89)  4.68(1.03)  -1.63(1.79)*  3.39(2.87)** 
ΔNEGt-2  0.28(0.27)  6.68(1.67)*  1.76(2.01)**   
ΔNEGt-3  -2.09(2.09)**  4.29(1.35)     
ΔNEGt-4    1.73(0.53)     
ΔNEGt-5    8.44(2.58)**     
ΔNEGt-6    15.13(4.93)**     
ΔNEGt-7    2.84(0.93)     
ΔNEGt-8    3.71(1.38)     
ΔNEGt-9    9.53(3.83)**     
ΔNEGt-10    0.84(0.34)     
ΔNEGt-11    7.73(3.47)**     
ΔNEGt-12         
Panel B: Long–Run Estimates 
ln Yi 2.10(5.75)** 2.93(2.79)** 11.82(14.95)** 9.34(1.53) 1.14(3.08)** -0.40(0.28) 0.96(2.06)** 0.79(4.02)** 
ln REXi -1.75(5.06)**  2.78(2.05)**  0.74(1.37)  -2.32(1.93)*  
POS  -4.28(4.83)**  -68.84(1.23)  4.52(1.45)  -3.21(3.46)** 
NEG  -3.46(4.17)**  5.35(0.71)  1.76(1.26)  -4.64(4.62)** 
Constant -36.63(3.90)** -56.52(2.07)** -12.43(1.60) -61.09(1.19) -9.93(1.05) 31.48(0.84) 10.00(0.43) -4.01(0.69) 
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics 
F 6.12** 9.29** 4.07** 5.29** 3.48 3.75 1.82 7.58* 
ECMt-1 -0.56(4.17)** -0.56(6.30)** -0.39(2.49) -0.36(1.43) -0.21(3.14) -0.21(3.23) -0.18(1.99) -0.58(4.42) 
LM 6.99 3.94 1.13 19.21** 3.46 0.61 7.45 7.03 
RESET 0.07 0.50 4.05 2.02 1.37 1.02 1.14 2.27 
Adjusted R
2
 0.28 0.33 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.39 0.24 0.37 
CS (CS
2
) S(US) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(US) S(US) S(S) S(S) 
WALD – S  0.83  0.93  1.51  2.72* 
WALD – L  3.85  0.48  0.18  25.13** 
Notes:  See end of the table.                                                                      
              
                                                   
  
  
 
  
Table 1 continued.  
  i=Japan i =Philippines i = Singapore i = South Korea 
L – ARDL NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL L – ARDL# NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL 
Panel A: Short–Run Estimates 
ΔlnY i,t 3.66(3.39)** 3.20(2.89)** -0.11(0.82) -0.22(1.67)* 1.32(3.86)** 0.94(5.81)** 2.09(3.49)** 1.14(2.71)** 
ΔlnY i,t-1  -0.94(0.68) -0.28(2.38)** 0.32(1.38)   3.30(5.78)** 2.13(3.97)** 
ΔlnY i,t-2  -2.78(2.17)**  0.59(2.51)**   2.86(4.88)** 1.79(4.54)** 
ΔlnY i,t-3  0.35(0.26)  0.93(4.05)**   1.23(1.87)*  
ΔlnY i,t-4  -2.06(1.66)  0.58(2.69)**     
ΔlnY i,t-5  -0.79(0.65)  0.39(1.76)*     
ΔlnY i,t-6  -0.79(0.65)  0.49(2.23)**     
ΔlnY i,t-7  1.03(0.95)  0.69(3.39)**     
ΔlnY i,t-8  -1.97(1.83)*  0.58(2.98)**     
ΔlnY i,t-9  -1.59(1.50)  0.56(3.46)**     
ΔlnY i,t-10  -1.52(1.46)       
ΔlnREXi,t -0.70(2.98)**  0.79(1.34)  0.28(1.81)*  -0.44(1.34)  
ΔlnREXi,t-1 0.45(1.71)*      0.57(1.80)*  
ΔlnREXi,t-2 -0.31(1.13)      -0.46(1.39)  
ΔlnREXi,t-3 -0.15(0.52)        
ΔlnREXi,t-4 0.06(0.21)        
ΔlnREXi,t-5 -0.47(1.78)*        
ΔlnREXi,t-6 0.31(1.21)        
ΔlnREXi,t-7 0.31(1.21)        
ΔlnREXi,t-8 -0.22(0.93)        
ΔlnREXi,t-9 -0.33(1.47)        
ΔPOSt  -0.99(1.08)  7.91(1.76)*  0.06(0.13)  -3.32(2.85)** 
ΔPOSt-1  -1.11(1.06)  7.14(2.15)**    2.10(1.69)* 
ΔPOSt-2  -0.17(0.18)  -4.56(1.38)    -1.53(1.23) 
ΔPOSt-3  1.96(1.92)*      -0.99(0.84) 
ΔPOSt-4  3.05(2.67)**      -0.16(0.14) 
ΔPOSt-5  0.62(0.52)      2.76(2.66)** 
ΔPOSt-6  1.58(1.30)      -0.76(0.68) 
ΔPOSt-7  1.35(1.25)      2.76(2.88)** 
ΔPOSt-8  0.77(0.74)      -0.89(0.95) 
ΔPOSt-9  -1.71(1.75)*      1.85(2.02)** 
ΔNEGt  -2.58(2.94)**  0.08(0.03)  2.69(2.79)**  -0.09(0.06) 
ΔNEGt-1  3.44(3.62)**  -3.96(1.34)    -2.56(1.55) 
ΔNEGt-2  -0.12(0.11)  -2.63(0.99)    4.48(2.75)** 
ΔNEGt-3  -0.89(0.79)  -2.09(0.98)    -3.16(1.79)* 
ΔNEGt-4  -1.08(1.07)  0.49(0.20)     
ΔNEGt-5  -2.02(1.98)*  6.47(2.57)**     
ΔNEGt-6  1.78(1.89)*  0.36(0.16)     
ΔNEGt-7  -2.23(2.66)**  -2.51(1.16)     
ΔNEGt-8    -7.47(3.32)**     
ΔNEGt-9    0.24(0.10)     
ΔNEGt-10    -1.25(0.52)     
ΔNEGt-11    -4.63(2.08)**     
ΔNEGt-12         
Panel B: Long–Run Estimates 
ln Yi 11.41(4.07)** 73.65(0.59) 0.29(0.99) -0.96(1.14) 1.06(14.28)** 1.49(8.72)** 1.98(3.85)** 6.57(0.59) 
ln REXi -0.95(0.77)  -1.75(1.54)  0.61(1.89)*  -1.37(0.71)  
POS  -36.43(0.57)  14.24(1.44)  0.09(0.13)  -12.62(0.47) 
NEG  -27.89(0.60)  2.91(0.73)  2.11(3.58)**  -3.98(0.30) 
Constant -361.02(3.91)** -2468.2(0.59) 16.47(1.70)* 42.76(1.99)* -3.37(2.03)** -14.03(3.42)** -37.82(1.70)* -194.04(0.54) 
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics 
F  3.47 2.92 2.29 5.98** 6.82* 8.28** 0.71 1.22[0.23] 
ECMt-1 -0.14(2.67) -0.04(0.62) -0.17(2.19) 1.65 -0.46(4.74)** -0.63(6.96)** -0.12(0.89) -0.07(0.47) 
LM 3.78 2.05 4.73 2.89 12.24** 8.24** 0.54 2.62 
RESET 20.80** 14.25** 3.39 8.59** 7.16** 7.86** 0.48 3.51* 
AdjustedR
2
 0.25 0.48 0.13 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.52 0.60 
CS (CS
2
) S(US) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(US) S(S) S(S) S(S) 
WALD – S  27.84**  0.75  3.63*  1.46 
WALD – L  0.22  0.04  5.02**  0.43 
Notes:  see end of the table.  
  
 
  
 
Table 1 continued.   
  i = Thailand i = United Kingdom  i = United States of America 
L - ARDL NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL – ARDL L – ARDL NL - ARDL 
Panel A: Short–Run Estimates 
ΔlnY i,t 1.93(5.59)** 2.03(3.81)** 1.67(1.08) -0.28(0.91) 5.18(3.14)** 2.58(1.38) 
ΔlnY i,t-1 0.83(1.77)* 0.03(0.04) 0.40(0.26)   -2.94(1.49) 
ΔlnY i,t-2 1.59(3.56)** 0.30(0.41) 2.99(2.02)**   -2.75(1.36) 
ΔlnY i,t-3 1.06(2.41) 0.69(0.87)    -0.62(0.29) 
ΔlnY i,t-4 0..63(1.45) -0.27(0.33)    3.81(1.89)* 
ΔlnY i,t-5 -0.36(0.96) -1.40(1.82)*     
ΔlnY i,t-6 1.01(2.81)** 0.74(0.95)     
ΔlnY i,t-7 -0.06(0.15) -0.64(0.77)     
ΔlnY i,t-8 0.29(0.77) -0.62(0.86)     
ΔlnY i,t-9 -0.17(0.48) -0.39(0.66)     
ΔlnY i,t-10 -0.09(0.27) -1.79(3.34)**     
ΔlnY i,t-11 -0.99(3.08)**      
ΔlnREXi,t -0.29(0.73)  -0.17(2.13)**  0.32(1.18)  
ΔlnREXi,t-1 0.91(2.57)**    -0.12(0.45)  
ΔlnREXi,t-2     0.57(2.13)**  
ΔPOSt  2.52(1.56)  -0.53(3.02)**  6.31(3.39)** 
ΔPOSt-1  -3.21(1.55)    5.39(2.73)** 
ΔPOSt-2  -2.03(0.89)    5.71(3.09)** 
ΔPOSt-3  -1.20(0.50)    -2.05(1.00) 
ΔPOSt-4  -0.59(0.25)    -6.41(3.43)** 
ΔPOSt-5  -2.05(0.90)    -1.62(0.87) 
ΔPOSt-6  -0.39(0.14)    0.53(0.29) 
ΔPOSt-7  -0.98(0.39)    5.18(2.94)** 
ΔPOSt-8  -4.12(2.12)**    0.11(0.07) 
ΔPOSt-9  2.12(1.12)    -0.98(0.63) 
ΔPOSt-10  -1.69(0.89)    -6.65(4.09)** 
ΔNEGt  -4.12(1.69)*  -0.76(1.19)  -0.56(0.69) 
ΔNEGt-1  -1.49(0.69)  1.28(1.92)*  -0.27(0.34) 
ΔNEGt-2  1.83(0.92)    1.67(1.87)* 
ΔNEGt-3  -1.96(0.95)    0.15(0.15) 
ΔNEGt-4  -2.45(1.12)    2.43(2.04)** 
ΔNEGt-5  -1.34(0.66)    -0.70(0.56) 
ΔNEGt-6  1.95(0.98)    0.72(0.64) 
ΔNEGt-7  -5.48(2.35)**    -2.33(2.29)** 
Panel B: Long–Run Estimates 
ln Yi 1.14(0.44) 1.81(1.46) -0.09(0.35) -0.57(0.86) 0.42(0.85) 2.41(5.15)** 
ln REXi -3.34(0.61)  -0.54(2.26)**  -0.79(1.54)  
POS  2.99(0.57)  -1.10(2.83)**  -2.53(5.03)** 
NEG  0.63(0.12)  -1.22(1.62)  0.09(0.16) 
Constant -2.89(0.03) -29.23(0.86) 21.87(3.12)** 35.48(2.04)** 8.21(0.54) -50.17(3.59)** 
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics 
F  0.82 1.42 7.18** 8.34** 2.81 9.93** 
ECMt-1 -0.10(0.69) -0.39(1.44) -0.31(4.56)** -0.48(5.08)** -0.19(2.67) -0.74(5.65)** 
LM 4.19 15.06** 4.39 18.83** 6.09 4.54 
RESET 1.72 0.17 1.58 0.75 3.39* 1.29 
AdjustedR
2
 0.46 0.52 0.02 0.03 0.49 0.52 
CS (CS
2
) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(US) 
WALD – S  0.54  0.21  0.41 
WALD – L  0.24  0.01  19.35** 
Notes:                                                                                                                                                              
1.-- Numbers inside the brackets are the absolute values of t-statistics. *, ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively.  
2.-- The critical value of the F test at the 10% (5%) significant level when there are two exogenous variables (k=2) and 50 observations is 4.31 (5.03)       
       respectively. These come from Narayan (2005, p. 1988). 
3.-- The number inside the bracket for the ECMt-1 statistic is absolute value of the t-ratio. Critical values for this tests are -3.47 (-3.82) at the 10% (5%)    
       level. Since Pesaran et al.’s (2001, p. 303) critical values are for large samples, we use those from Banerjee et al. (1998, Table 1, p. 276).  
4.-- LM is Lagrange Multiplier test of residuals serial correlation. Since data are quarterly, we test for 4th order serial correlation. It is distributed as χ2  
      with four degrees of freedom. The critical value at 10% (5%) level is 7.77 (9.48) 
5.-- RESET is Ramsey’s test for misspecification. This is also distributed as χ2  with one degree of freedom. Its critical value at 10% and 5% level are   
      2.71 and 3.84 respectively.  
6.-- Both Wald statistics are distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 2.71 and 3.84 respectively. 
  
 
  
7.-- # indicate that the Financial Crisis dummy was significant in these models. 
Table 2:  Full-Information Estimates of Both Linear ARDL (L-ARDL) and Nonlinear ARDL (NL-ARDL) Import Demand Models.   
 i=Australia  i=China, Mainland i= Hong Kong  i=Indonesia  
L – ARDL# NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL L – ARDL# NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL 
Panel A: Short–Run Estimates 
ΔlnYMt 0.08(1.32) 0.24(1.60) 0.52(2.34)** 0.69(2.11)** 0.32(1.91)* 0.52(2.02)** 0.14(1.52) 0.33(1.74)* 
ΔlnYMt-1   -01.3(0.61) 0.51(0.85)     
ΔlnYMt-2   0.09(0.58) 0.41(0.68)     
ΔlnYM,t-3   -0.51(3.22)** 0.35(0.79)     
ΔlnYMt-4   -0.08(0.51) 0.68(1.87)*     
ΔlnYMt-5   -0.40(2.45)** 0.19(0.63)     
ΔlnYMt-6   -0.10(0.65) 0.19(0.68)     
ΔlnYMt-7   0.22(0.13) 0.44(1.84)*     
ΔlnYMt-8   0.06(0.38) 0.44(1.64)     
ΔlnYMt-9   -0.26(1.71)** 0.003(0.01)     
ΔlnYMt-10    0.35(1.46)     
ΔlnYMt-11         
ΔlnREXi,t -0.36(2.55)**  1.53(3.02)**  0.98(3.66)**  -0.26(2.51)**  
ΔlnREXi,t-1   -0.45(0.53)      
ΔlnREXi,t-2   -0.24(0.29)      
ΔlnREXi,t-3   0.21(0.32)      
ΔlnREXi,t-4   -0.76(1.37)      
ΔlnREXi,t-5   -0.33(0.81)      
ΔlnREXi,t-6   1.16(3.36)**      
ΔlnREXi,t-7   -0.96(1.84)*      
ΔPOSt  -2.01(1.68)*  -0.82(0.13)  5.57(2.22)**  -0.38(0.82) 
ΔPOSt-1  2.60(2.18)**  -21.71(2.75)**  5.91(2.39)**  1.27(2.16)** 
ΔPOSt-2  0.21(0.18)  -18.34(2.77)**  1.98(0.80)  1.23(2.05)** 
ΔPOSt-3  2.57(2.14)**  -10.81(1.70)*  4.38(1.76)*   
ΔPOSt-4  1.77(1.53)  -12.59(1.92)*  -1.05(0.38)   
ΔPOSt-5  -1.62(1.49)  -12.20(2.02)**  -2.11(0.71)   
ΔPOSt-6    -6.45(1.15)  2.62(1.09)   
ΔPOSt-7    -5.03(1.06)  -2.19(0.89)   
ΔPOSt-8    -12.38(1.99)*  -3.72(1.91)*   
ΔPOSt-9    12.56(2.16)**  -1.40(0.78)   
ΔPOSt-10    -9.09(1.89)*  -4.08(2.24)**   
ΔNEGt  0.75(0.61)  2.99(1.03)  2.41(2.28)**  -1.66(3.40)** 
ΔNEGt-1  3.58(2.96)**  -14.87(2.33)**  -1.62(1.46)   
ΔNEGt-2    -15.12(2.59)**  1.58(1.29)   
ΔNEGt-3    13.05(2.42)**  -1.81(1.51)   
ΔNEGt-4    -16.58(3.12)**  2.61(1.65)   
ΔNEGt-5    -13.20(2.78)**  1.79(1.11)   
ΔNEGt-6    -1.15(0.49)  0.49(0.34)   
ΔNEGt-7    -8.04(2.76)**  1.77(1.25)   
ΔNEGt-8    -3.13(0.97)  1.81(1.27)   
ΔNEGt-9    -3.00(0.99)  0.29(0.21)   
ΔNEGt-10    1.02(0.43)  -2.31(1.78)*   
ΔNEGt-11    -5.23(2.27)**     
ΔNEGt-12         
Panel B: Long–Run Estimates 
ln YM 0.43(1.58) 1.94(0.92) 2.05(13.08)** 0.64(0.91) 0.09(0.44) 0.29(0.46) 0.74(3.01)** 0.17(0.42) 
ln REXi -1.93(2.15)**  3.31(2.86)**  1.78(2.59)**  -1.44(1.98)*  
POS  -17.16(1.14)  28.57(3.30)**  2.89(1.07)  -4.51(2.89)** 
NEG  -9.55(1.54)  14.41(5.21)**  3.04(2.68)**  -6.23(3.29)** 
Constant 8.52(1.37) -24.73(0.49) -47.44(5.15)** 4.22(0.25) 16.28(3.58)** 13.09(0.85) 13.36(1.08) 15.47(1.60) 
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics 
F 5.95** 5.77** 1.45 4.00** 4.66** 3.22 1.40 3.07 
ECMt-1 -0.18(3.48)* -0.12(1.63) -0.24(2.01) -0.86(3.01) -0.25(2.53) -0.35(2.35) -0.18(2.56) -0.27(3.27) 
LM 2.48 3.87 4.89 15.27** 6.29 7.62 1.11 6.32 
RESET 0.59 0.83 1.39 7.33** 0.01 2.65 0.79 2.95* 
Adjusted R
2
 0.21 0.25 0.56 0.49 0.29 0.37 0.27 0.24 
CS (CS
2
) S(US) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) 
WALD – S  2.58  1.56  0.28  2.71* 
WALD – L  0.03  2.66  0.35  2.01 
Notes: see end of the table.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
  
 
  
Table 2 continued.  
 i=Japan  i= Philippines  i=Singapore  i=South Korea  
L – ARDL NL - ARDL L – ARDL# NL – ARDL# L - ARDL NL - ARDL L - ARDL NL - ARDL 
Panel A: Short–Run Estimates 
ΔlnYM t 0.29(2.16)** 0.22(1.35) 0.48(1.55) 0.43(1.30) 0.17(3.56)** 0.38(1.74)*  0.58(1.96)* 
ΔlnYM,t-1 0.12(0.88) -0.63(3.03)** 0.87(2.86)** 1.11(2.93)**  -1.05(3.73)**  -0.77(2.25)** 
ΔlnYM t-2 0.06(0.42) -0.39(2.32)**    -0.70(3.02)**  -0.27(0.86) 
ΔlnYM t-3 -0.22(1.48) -0.66(4.17)**    -0.39(2.27)**  -0.37(1.24) 
ΔlnYM,t-4 0.08(0.57) -0.14(0.89)    -0.25(1.55)  0.07(0.25) 
ΔlnYM t-5 -0.42(2.89)** -0.54(3.79)**    -0.24(1.66)  -0.61(2.24)** 
ΔlnYM t-6 -0.22(1.54) -0.67(4.03)**    -0.39(2.61)**  -0.47(1.91)* 
ΔlnYMt-7  -0.34(2.45)**       
ΔlnYMt-8  -0.11(0.85)       
ΔlnYM t-9         
ΔlnREXi,t -0.02(0.09)  0.36(1.20)  0.94(2.33)**  -0.29(0.92)  
ΔlnREXi,t-1 0.35(1.98)*    -0.72(1.49)  -0.46(1.50)  
ΔlnREXi,t-2     -0.56(1.17)  0.70(2.26)**  
ΔlnREXi,t-3     -0.57(1.25)    
ΔlnREXi,t-4     0.03(0.07)    
ΔlnREXi,t-5     -0.38(0.82)    
ΔlnREXi,t-6     -0.61(1.32)    
ΔlnREXi,t-7     -1.46(3.26)**    
ΔlnREXi,t-8     -0.79(1.70)*    
ΔlnREXi,t-9     0.22(0.48)    
ΔlnREXi,t-10     0.83(1.87)*    
ΔlnREXi,t-11     -0.89(2.04)**    
ΔlnREXi,t-12         
ΔPOSt  -1.02(3.83)**  3.08(1.55)  -4.61(2.45)**  -2.90(1.87)* 
ΔPOSt-1        -3.22(2.64)** 
ΔPOSt-2        -0.09(0.06) 
ΔPOSt-3        -2.38(1.94)* 
ΔPOSt-4        -0.74(0.59) 
ΔPOSt-5        -1.69(1.37) 
ΔPOSt-6        2.16(1.75)* 
ΔNEGt  0.95(1.54)  -2.98(1.08)  2.82(2.16)**  0.78(0.48) 
ΔNEGt-1  1.21(1.74)*    -1.42(0.88)  -3.09(1.58) 
ΔNEGt-2  -0.79(1.09)    -2/75(1.73)*  0.71(0.34) 
ΔNEGt-3  -0.30(0.39)    -1.74(1.04)  -1.43(0.66) 
ΔNEGt-4  -0.50(0.64)    -2.16(1.27)  -0.78(0.39) 
ΔNEGt-5  -0.87(1.02)    -2.83(1.61)  -3.18(1.53) 
ΔNEGt-6  -1.79(2.24)**    -4.16(2.39)**  -3.62(1.77)* 
ΔNEGt-7  -1.02(1.32)    -5.55(3.23)**  1.60(0.92) 
ΔNEGt-8  -2.97(3.96)**    -4.92(2.72)**  -0.23(0.13) 
ΔNEGt-9  -1.01(1.17)    -2.35(1.17)  1.96(1.13) 
ΔNEGt-10  -1.52(2.06)**    -4.97(2.82)**  3.49(2.06)** 
ΔNEGt-11  -2.37(2.82)**      1.78(1.06) 
ΔNEGt-12         
Panel B: Long–Run Estimates 
ln YM 0.14(1.37) 2.41(4.53)** -0.02(0.06) -1.54(0.92) 0.89(5.01)** 2.72(7.32)** 0.62(6.59)** -12.75(0.64) 
ln REXi -0.38(0.72)  1.98(1.59)  2.91(1.57)  -0.54(1.05)  
POS  -3.16(2.70)**  14.31(1.59)  -10.07(3.34)**  15.26(0.69) 
NEG  3.70(3.00)**  4.78(1.77)*  5.78(2.82)**  -34.58(0.67) 
Constant 20.02(10.43)** -35.59(2.79)** 14.26(2.03)** 56.01(1.39) 1.75(0.53) -44.29(4.93)** 8.77(2.03)** 321.26(0.68) 
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics 
F  4.42** 6.75** 3.56 2.91 3.95* 5.42** 6.12** 3.87** 
ECMt-1 -0.23(2.78) -0.32(3.93)* -0.18(2.28) -0.21(2.58) -0.19(2.93) -0.46(4.55)** -0.28(4.23)** 0.08(0.66) 
LM 2.85 3.70 2.98 2.79 1.94 1.79 6.29 7.57 
RESET 2.79* 4.28** 5.65** 5.83** 5.02** 3.16* 1.11 0.85 
AdjustedR
2
 0.34 0.42 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.18 
CS (CS
2
) S(US) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(US) S(S) S(S) S(S) 
WALD – S  3.38*  0.15  10.06**  0.34 
WALD – L  14.62**  0.60  46.50**  0.41 
Notes:  see end of the table. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
  
 
  
 
Table 2 continued.  
 i=Thailand  i=U.K.   i=U.S. 
L – ARDL NL – ARDL L – ARDL# NL – ARDL L – ARDL NL – ARDL 
Panel A: Short–Run Estimates 
ΔlnYM,t 0.16(3.00)** 0.38(2.46)** 0.13(1.32) 0.10(1.17) 0.03(0.22) -0.05(0.38) 
ΔlnYM,t-1     0.17(1.36) -0.14(1.02) 
ΔlnYMt-2     0.32(2.44)** 0.21(1.66) 
ΔlnYM,t-3     -0.13(0.98) 0.02(0.16) 
ΔlnYMt-4     0.29(2.23)** 0.46(3.36)** 
ΔlnYMt-5     0.23(1.76)* -0.15(1.04) 
ΔlnYMt-6      0.08(0.54) 
ΔlnYMt-7      -0.14(1.16) 
ΔlnYMt-8      0.04(0.33) 
ΔlnYMt-9      0.03(0.22) 
ΔlnYMt-10      -0.22(1.89)* 
ΔlnYMt-11      -0.20(1.68)* 
ΔlnREXi,t 0.43(1.32)  0.13(1.32)  0.19(1.89)*  
ΔlnREXi,t-1 -0.07(0.21)      
ΔlnREXi,t-2 -0.75(2.17)**      
ΔlnREXi,t-3       
ΔPOSt  -0.35(0.24)  -2.21(1.60)  -0.21(0.14) 
ΔPOSt-1  -4.45(3.47)**  -1.85(1.31)  3.58(2.46)** 
ΔPOSt-2  -6.07(4.73)**  1.35(1.04)  2.85(1.96)* 
ΔPOSt-3  -2.74(1.98)*  -0.29(0.23)  1.24(0.83) 
ΔPOSt-4  -2.01(1.58)  -1.68(1.28)  -1.36(0.93) 
ΔPOSt-5  -1.68(1.39)  1.50(1.10)  -1.81(1.17) 
ΔPOSt-6  -3.12(2.56)**  0.86(0.84)  3.35(1.88)* 
ΔPOSt-7  -2.15(2.10)**  0.57(1.66)  -2.21(1.29) 
ΔPOSt-8  -2.48(2.10)**  2.65(2.79)**  -2.16(1.31) 
ΔPOSt-9  -2.17(1.83)*    -3.34(2.16)** 
ΔPOSt-10  -3.44(2.72)**     
ΔPOSt-11       
ΔPOSt-12       
ΔNEGt  1.91(1.41)  0.83(0.98)  1.13(4.26)** 
ΔNEGt-1  2.86(2.15)**  2.12(2.33)**   
ΔNEGt-2       
Panel B: Long–Run Estimates 
ln Yi 0.89(6.46)** 0.50(1.17) 0.17(3.56)** 0.39(1.33) 0.18(4.68)** 0.39(7.25)** 
ln REXi -1.40(1.34)  0.28(1.39)  0.42(1.98)*  
POS  -0.15(0.05)  -0.19(0.17)  -0.22(0.49) 
NEG  -1.11(0.66)  0.89(0.76)  1.3(4.71)** 
Constant 1.78(0.33) 8.86(0.79) 16.33(12.87)** 10.52(1.47) 17.73(17.27)** 12.43(9.79)** 
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics 
F  2.13 6.45** 7.62** 1.78 8.19** 9.33** 
ECMt-1 -0.18(3.21) -0.27(4.14) -0.46(4.82)** -0.25(2.05) 0.46(5.14)** -0.79(5.97)** 
LM 2.65 4.26 8.56* 4.58 4.70 11.69** 
RESET 8.79** 0.01 0.41 0.04 0.44 7.12** 
AdjustedR
2
 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.29 0.11 0.46 
CS (CS
2
) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) S(S) 
WALD – S  10.18**  3.64*  24.47** 
WALD – L  1.19  0.81  8.51** 
                                                                                                          
Notes:  
1.-- Numbers inside the brackets are the absolute values of t-statistics. .*, ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively 
2.- The critical value of the F test at the 10% (5%) significant level when there are two exogenous variables (k=2) and 50 observations is 4.31 (5.03)       
       respectively. These come from Narayan (2005, p. 1988). 
3.-- The number inside the bracket for the ECMt-1 statistic is absolute value of the t-ratio. Critical values for this tests are -3.47 (-3.82) at the 10% (5%)    
       level. Since Pesaran et al.’s (2001, p. 303) critical values are for large samples, we use those from Banerjee et al. (1998, Table 1, p. 276).  
4.-- LM is Lagrange Multiplier test of residuals serial correlation. Since data are quarterly, we test for 4th order serial correlation. It is distributed as χ2  
      with four degrees of freedom. The critical value at 10% (5%) level is 7.77 (9.48) 
5.-- RESET is Ramsey’s test for misspecification. This is also distributed as χ2  with one degree of freedom. Its critical value at 10% and 5% level are   
      2.71 and 3.84 respectively. 
6.-- Both Wald statistics are distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 2.71 and 3.84 respectively. 
7.--   # indicate that the Financial Crisis dummy was significant in these models. 
